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ing on the methodology and results of benefit dence studies on specific government funcdons
incidence analysis in developing countries. or programs that can help policymakers reach
conclusions about proposed reallocations of
Research in this area faces all the general- resources among govermment programs.
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BENEFIT INCIDENCE ANALYSIS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
L Introduction
Measuring benefits of govermnent expenditures across income, race and other
characteristics of individuals is an elusive empirical issue. As interesting and as difficult as it
is to allocate tax burdens to individuals, the profession knows even less about allocating
benefits.1 In this paper, we review the recent literature on benefit incidence and offer
suggestions concemning further research, focusing particular attention on benefit incidence in
developing countries.
Benefit incidence studies have a long history, but the interest in benefit incidence surged
as a result of Robert McNamara's optimism about the degree to which government spending can
alter the income distribution and living standards of the poor in developing countries. According
to McNamara, "Shifts in the pattems of public expenditure represent one of the most effective
techniques a govenmment possesses to improve the conditions of the poor" (McNamnara, 1972,
p. 17). Knowledge of benefit Incidence by income and other variables can be useful in
reallocating public resources toward programs that benefit the poor.2
The literature on benefit incidence has three distinct periods. In the eady literature or pre-
1975, benefits are allocated to households either on a per capita basis or in proportion to the
income of the household. Both allocation mechanisms yield obvious conclusions about benefit
incidence. There is also a preoccupation in the early literature with allocating the entire budget
including the benefits of so-called pure public goods, such as defense.
Aaron and McGuire (1970) attempt to reduce the inherent arbitrariness of the allocation
of pure public good benefits to households by deriving benefit measures based on a specific
utility function. The parameters of their utility function suggest a strong pro-rich distribution of
benefits, at least in developed countries.
DeWulf (1975) in his review of the many early studies quite rightly criticized them for
not accounting for different income elasticities for different public services and a host of other
problems. After the DeWulf critique, a second wave of benefit studies in both developed and
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developing countries turned to the allocation of expenditure made on more specific goods to
households based on micro data on household utilization of the public services. Examples
include Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) for the United States, Meerrnan (1979) for Malaysia,
and Selowsky (1979) for Colombia. The latter two studies led the research on benefits in
developing countries away from very general allocation systems and toward more specific benefit
assignments based on utilization of public services. The disaggregation of general results made
the studies of greater value to policy makers allocating resources among social goods.
The second period studies are distinguished from the first period studies in three ways:
(i) use of micro data describing households' utilization of public services to allocate the public
expenditure on particular social goods among households; (ii) recognition of the irmportance of
accurate income measurement for households, and accounting for the size of the household as
weil as its total income in categorizing households into income quintiles, and (iii) disaggregation
of services within a social function. For example, separate benefit incidence computations were
performed for primary, secondary and post secondary educational spending.
We generally agree with the direction the post-1975 literature has taken. By not dwelling
on the entire fiscal picture researchers have more rapidly developed the stock of knowledge about
specific social expenditures in developing countries. We believe the approach since 1975 has
great potential for informing policy choices on shiftng resources within programs to target
benefits to the poor more accurately. Nonetheless, researchers studying developing countries may
need to pay extra attention to (i) expenditures made through off-budget programs such as public
enterprises, (ii) benefit shifting especially for agricultural programs, (iii) differential public service
quality, especially between urban and rural areas, (iv) the effects of benefits on inter- and intra-
family transfers, and (v) the effects of benefits on urban-rural migration.
In a recent third wave of benefit incidence, Gertler and Glewwe (1989), Gertler and van
der Gaag (1988), Gertler, et al. (1988), and Laraki (1989), estimated demand curves for various
social services. Demand curves for particular population subgroups can be used to calculate
changes in welfare based measures (or compensating variation) of social services benefits.
Studies using welfare-based measures of benefits for a wide range of public functions can yield
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valuable information to policy makers and help target the limited resources for redistribution
toward those public services of maximum benefit to the poor. However, these studies do not,
to date, e..fer benefit measures on the broad range of government services that more traditional
benefit incidence studies offer.
The next section of the paper reviews the methodology of benefit incidence, followed by
a section focusing particular attention on methodological issues in developing countries. The
fourth section briefly examines recent empirical results on benefit incidence obtained for
developed countries. The fifth section examines the empirical results for developing countries,
and in the last section we present our conclusions, including recommendations for further
research and guidance.to researchers charged with doing benefit incidence studies within a
limited time frame.
IL Methodology
There is some confusion in the empirical literature about terminology, necessitating some
preliminary remarks. Musgrave (1959), McLure (1974), McLure and Thirsk (1975), Meerman
(1979), DeWulf (1981), and Piggott and Whalley (1987), distinguish between expenditure
incidence and benefit incidence. The former concept refers to the changes in relative factor and
product prices and real incomes that result from government input purchases and the production
cf public output. Expenditure incidence does not explicitly account for the benefits of public
goods (McLure et al., 1975, p. 195). Benefit incidence examines the consumption of govermment
services by income or other subgroup, and ideally would include the shifting of government
benefits and the relative price and real income changes due to changes in the demand for private
goods.3 We adopt this terminology, recognizing that it differs from that used by some authors.
Ideally, the total benefit incidence of existing government programs (the "post-fisc"
equilibrium) would measure benefits relative to a counterfactual world without govenmment ( he
"pre-fisc" equilibrium). No research has yet established a counterfactual world, without
government. Most empirical studies of benefit incidence allocate public expenditures, and not
consumer surplus benefits, to households based on tbeir utilization of the services. The consumer
4
surplus and expenditure-based measures of benefits are illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of
efficient pruvbion of the public good (at qo). The compensating variation or total benefit
measure consists of areas "A" and "B" in the graph (Aaron and McGuire, 1970; Maital, 1975;
Meerman, 1979; Hewitt, 1987; Piggott and Whalley, 1987). Conventional expenditure-based
benefit incidence studies typically allocate the expenditure on the public good among households,
represented by area "A" on the graph. Benefits are then compared among households in different
income groups or other socio-economic groups.
On the one hand, this typical method of measuring household benefits does not consider
a number of important issues that affect benefit incidence. For exnample, it assumes that all
relative prices and real incomes are fixed, and benefits are not shifted, marginal benefits are equal
to average benefits, and average cost is a good proxy for marginal benefit. These assumptions
expose the traditional methodology to numerous criticisms. Many programs, such as agricultural
programs, are designed to affect real incomes and relative prices. In addition, public transfers
to low-income households may crowd out private transfers and shift benefits to the households
fonnerly making private transfers (Hochman and Rodgers, 1969; Barro, 1974, 1978; Lampman
and Smeeding, 1983; Andreoni, 1990; Cox and Jimenez, 1992). Added to these basic issues are
those sr:rounding the treatment of benefits from physical capital expenditures and from human
capital investments that accrue to households m more than one time period.
On the other hand, expenditure-based benefit measures are more comparable to tax
burdens and to private disposable income than are compensated variation measures, insofar as
tax burdens and disposable income do not include the consumer surplus related to private
spending (Aaron and McGuire, p. 909; Maital, pp. 407-408). Also, total benefit measures require
information about the demand schedule for the public good and may be difficult to implement.
In any event, for many small policy changes the total benefit and expenditure-based approaches
should yield similar results (Selden and Wasylenko, 1992).
Despite its limitations, we believe the expenditure-based incidence approach can provide
a useful first look at the allocation of government expenditure among households. The
Figure 1
Measuring Benefits:
Average Cost Versus Total Benefit
$ 
B ..
A
Q
A = Total Cost
A + B = Full Consumer Benefit
(Diagam Reflects Assumption That Marginal Benefit Equals Marginal Cost)
Source: Authors
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expenditure-based incidence approach can be especially useful for examining the distributional
impact of marginal changes in the government's budget.
Benefit incidence studies typicaily examine public expendiures by three major categories:
public spending on general goods, such as defense, public spending on specific public goods,
such as education and health care, and cash and in-kind transfers. We follow that rubric in
examining benefit incidence methods for public expenditures. We also examine below the
appropriate allocation of capital expenditure, interest payments and side payments made to
government officials. We then make a number of recommendations to help insure that future
research is as useful as possible.
General Benefits
Attribution rules for general benefits can be distinguished by whether they are (i)
rigorously derived from assumptions about preferences (Aaron and McGuire, 1970; Maital, 1973),
or (iij simply postulated (ad hoc) as intuitively appealing. Aaron and McGuire develop a utility-
based method to allocate the expenditure on pure (general) public goods among households. The
Aaron and McGuire approach requires that utility functions be separable in public and private
goods and that the public good is consumed in equal amounts by all individuals. In addition,
their approach requires choosing parameters for the utility function. The ad hoc methods, on the
other hand, allocate expenditures on pure public goods to households on the basis of their
proportion of total income or of their proportion of total population.
Both the utility-based distributors and the more ad hoc distributors can lead to implausible
results. For exnample, with United States data, Maital (1973), using Aaron and McGuire's
approach, finds a strongly pro-rich incidence for general public goods.4 In another study of
expenditures in the United States, Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) use an ad hoc allocation rule
and fmd benefits for pure public goods to be more pro-poor than even public cash transfer
programs. Moreover, Denzau and MacKay (1976) and Philpotts (1987) question Aaron and
McGuire's assumptions of separable utility in private and public goods and of all individuals
receiving the same amount of the public good. Indeed, by lumping expenditures on several
general public goods together, researchers assume that the benefit-income relationship is invariant
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among the public goods (DeWulf, 1981). Given these difficulties, many recent authors consider
the allocation of general benefits so problematic that they exclude such goods from their studies.
Specific Benefits and Transfer Payments
There are three main methods to allocate specific benefits and transfers. The first
approach is to make ad hoc assumptiu- , about the incidence of particular programs. For
instance, agricultural benefits are often distributed in proportion to farm income. The second
approach is to infer the incidence from legislative intent, making a strong assumption that
benefits flow to intended beneficiaries. The third, and by far the most informative, approach uses
household survey data to deternine household members' utilization of particular programs.
Of course, allocable public expenditure may also have external (or "nonrecipient")
benefits, as when education affects general productivity and social order, as well as the
productivity of the individual receiving the education. One way of accounting for extemal
benefits is the Tax Foundation (1967) approach of treating portions of some specific and transfer
benefits as if they were general. However, in most cases the amount of indirect benefits and the
allocation of these benefits are arbitrary choices that may provide misleading measures of benefit
progressivity.
Also, it is important to consider benefit shifting. As noted, public transfers crowd out
private interfamily transfers, so that some of the benefits from new public transfeis may accrue
to private donors who may diminish their inter-family transfers. Agricultural program benefits
can also be shifted from farmers to consumers in the fonn of lower food prices or to landlords
in the form of higher demand and rents for land. In fact, Allen (1982) has shown that even
lump-sum transfers can have large enough relative price and income effects to offset the benefits
from cash transfer programs. Most incidence studisq do not analyze benefit shift or extemal
benefits. In cases where shifting and external effects may be important, researchers should
consider a range of possible shifting and external benefit assumptions in assessing the
distributional impact of certain programs.
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Capital Expenditures
Many public expenditures, including infrastructure projects, other capital spending, as wen
as current expenditures for education, provide benefits to households for multiple years. Data
on government capital expenditures are generally available by function for several years, but
allocating the benefits of these capiti.. expenditures to households will generally involve mapping
the present value of the multi-year benefits to households. In an expenditure-based framework,
one would multiply the value of the capital stock by the sum of the opportunity cost of capital
and depreciation as a proxy for capital services in each year. Of course, capital stock value data
are typically not available in most countries. In practice, benefit incidence studies handle
multiple period benefits in a variety of ways, and we reiterate several methods when we discuss
specific studies.5
Interest Payments
Several earlier studies incorrectly allocate government interest payments for bonds to
households as governnent benefits. Interest payments should never be treated as transfer
payments to households (Hammes and Wills, 1987), as the interest payments double-count
benefits that have already been counted in the allocation of service flows from the capital
expenditure. Some studies use interest payments as a proxy for services from capital
expenditures, however, and avoid double-counting by not separately allocating service flows from
capital expenditures.6
Rent-Seeking and Side Payments
In both developed and developing countries, benefits can be shifted and dissipated through
what has become known as "rent-seeking," whereby individuals or groups of individuals attempt
to influence government behavior (Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock, 1988, and Mohammed and
Whalley, 1984). It appears reasonable to subtract rent-seeking expenditures by individuals from
the cost of the govenmment good or service to more closely approximate th- net benefit to the
individual. Data on side-payments is generally not available, but researchers should be mindfiu
that side-payments may reduce the direct benefits of the program.
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Measurement Issues
Benefit incidence analysts inevitably face a large number of problems in developing
reliable benefit allocations. We discuss below several important measurement issues, such as the
unit of evaluation, the period of analysis, the grouping of households on the basis of income and
other socio-economic variables, and some limitations of incidence measures.
Unit of Evaluation: Household or Individual. Benefits to individuals are the focus
of many social programs. However, the fundamental economic or income unit is the household.
Individuals typically combine the resources of the household, and expenditures are made either
as part of a household decision or by adults on behalf of the interests of household members.
While most studies examine ben:fit incidence among households, in some applications it is
important to bear in mind that government programs can have important effects on the intra-
family distribution of resources among individuals, particularly in developing countries (see
section m, below).
Period of Analysis: Lifetime or Current Period. Two issues--the period used to
measure income and the period over which one measures benefits from govenmment programs-
are inportant in this context. With respect to inccme, economists generally agree that permanent
or lifedme income, rather than current income, better reflects the economic position of
households.
The expenditure survey data available in most countries, including the United States, do
not permit a lifetime incidence analysis.78 However, DeWulf (1975) argues that a lifetime
perspective on income is theoreticaUy problematic. hnperfections in the capital market that
preclude borrowing against future eamnings and the shortsigltzdness of consumers make the life
cycle approach to fiscal incidence not particularly relevant to individual welfare. This argument
may apply with pardcular force in developing countries given their widely-recognized credit
market imnperfections.
Measuring program benefits, that accrue over timne raises additional research questions.
For instance, many studies allocate educational benefits to households based on the participation
of students in school. This distribution of benefits is then compared to the distribution of
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parental income. However, if educated children eventually move to higher income brackets, it
may be equally appropriate to argue that the benefits to education accrue to members of higher
income brackets (Pechman, 1972; DeWulf, 1981). Data often preclude knowing the future
income status of a given program recipient, making it difficult to assess the incidence of future
benefits from education or other programs.9
Grouping Households by Income and Other Variables. The most common grouping
of households is by income. Researchers have used both pre-fisc income (pre-tax income,
excluding transfer payments and oenefits from governnent programs), reflecting the focus on the
zero govemment counterfactual, as well as post-fisc income (adjusted for taxes, transfers and
govenunent program benefits) measures. Numerous authors have debated the appropriate
measurement of income, and we direct the reader to the excellent discussions in Bird and DeWulf
(1973) and Smolensky, Hoyt, and Danzinger (1987). For developing countries, researchers need
to pay spacial attention to both noncash (or in-kind) income and different living costs in urban
and rural areas. Different living costs across urban and rural areas will make nominal income
a poor measure of the relative economic well-being across areas.
We feel that there should be more emphasis placed on the use of income deciles (or at
least quintiles), as several studies use arbitraq income levels to group households. The use of
deciles facilitates both intemational comparisons and intertemporal comparisons, particularly
when significant inflation has occurred between the analysis periods. Another important issue
concerns adjustment for household composition. One approach is to use household equivalence
scales (van der Gaag and Smolensky, 1982). Meernan (1979) and Selowsky (1979) use per
capita household income to construct income deciles. Both researchers also confumed a very
weak correlation between household total income and household per capita income, so that
accounting for family size in income measures will generally yield a different ordering of
households' well-being.
Finally, in addition to income there exists a wide range of variables that one might use
to distinguish among households, including race, religion, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, age,
geographic location, and urban-rural location. When the data exist, we believe that it is often
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informative to disaggregate by these variables in conjunction with income, so that one might, for
instance, know the benefit incidence of health spending on the rural poor.10
Average Versus Marginal Incidence. In many cases, policy makers are less
concemed about existing program benefits than about the incidence of marginal program benefits
(i.e., the incidence of benefits `rom an increase in the program expenditures). The marginal
beneficiary may be, for example, significantly poorer than the average existing beneficiary. For
instance, marginal students enrolled in schools of all levels may be less well-to-do than the
average student enrolled, because the well-to-do gain access first. Similarly, additional rural
health clinics are likely to be located in more remote and more impoverished areas than rural
health clinics on average. Public sewers and rural electrification are other examples of publicly-
provided goods to which households in higher income groups gain access first.
Standard benefit incidence measures only capture the average mix of beneficiaries. While
these measures may be appropriate for calculating post-fisc inequality, they may be poor guides
for policy decisions at the margin. Examining the benefit distributions of a program within a
country at successive points in time may help identify the marginal beneficiaries of the program
expansion (see Selowsky, 1979 and van de Walle, 1992). In addition, behavioral models, such
as those developed by Gertler et al., may allow the researcher to simulate the effect of smaU
policy changes on the beneficiary mix. FinaUy, more detailed institutional analyses of barriers
to participation in certain programs, as discussed below, may offer important insights into the
marginal beneficiaries of policy interventions and of expanded program expenditures.
Aggregate Measures of Progressivity. Several researchers have followed Reynolds
and Smolensky (1977), who report pre-fisc and post-fisc Gini coefficients."1 While such
aggregate or "global" measures make comparisons of progressivity among studies more expedient,
there is clearly a loss of information as one moves from reporting the incidence results by decile
and by government program or functional expenditure category, to any aggregate measure. Thus,
we are skeptical about the practical value of aggregate measures.
Furthermore, we believe that better targeting of benefits to the poor requires the greatest
possible disaggregation of the benefit data. For instance, in the health sector it is far more usefuil
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to report benefit incidence by type of care and by health program, than to report the benefit
incidence from aggregate spending on health care. The former allows a quick assessment of the
distributional impact of realocating resources within the health sector, whereas the latter only
allows one to gauge the overaU impact of moving resources into or out of the health sector.
Compt2table General Equilibrium Models
Piggott and WhaUey (1987) have analyzed net fiscal incidence for the Australian economy
within a computable general equilibrium (CGE) context. The model is quite complex even
though Piggott and Whalley make many simplifying assumptions, such as efficient provision of
public goods. The main point of their exercise is to compare the results from a general model
that accounts for the consumer surplus from public goods and for the marginal welfare costs from
taxation to the results from a more typical case in the literature where taxes and t nefits are
simnply allocated among households throughout the income distribution.
Three major points emerge from their model. First, for marginal increases in public
goods, consumer surplus effects from additional public goods are minimal, but the welfare effects
of taxes used to finance the additional public goods are substantial. Second, if public goods are
substantiaUy reduced, the consumer surplus effects can be substantial and the reduced consumer
surpluses affect low-mcome and high-income households differentally. According to their
simulations, smaller marginal reductions in public goods favor higher income households. A
third finding is that the general equhilibnum welfare results can range from favoring high-income
households to favoring low-income households depending on their assumptions about the
elasticities among substitution of goods in the household utility functions.
The results of the general equilibrium analysis do not bode well for reaching definitive
answers on benefit incidence or on net fiscal incidence. The sensitivity of the general
equilibrium results to parameter specifications of the model means that definitive answers to
benefit incidence depend on the accurate estination of the parameters of the model. Absent
better empirical knowledge about functional form and elasticity parameters, general equilibrium
models may dramatize the weaknesses in benefit incidence studies but the models may also not
yield precise estimnates of fiscal incidence.
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Two Measures of Benefits for Local Public Goods
Several researchers have estimated a deinand curve for local public goods through
evidence on voter behavior or property values.12 The resulting demand curves can then be used
to derive consumer surplus measures of public good benefits. In one recent exnample, Martinez-
Vasquez (1982) estimates a demand function for local public goods in St. Louis using cross-
section data for the State of Missouri. From the demand function, he derives the marginal
benefits of local public goods, matches them with tax shares paid by individuals, and derives a
measure of the net fiscal incidence of local public goods across income and other population
groups.
Chaudry-Shah (1989) uses the capitalization of expenditures and taxes into property values
as another vehicle to measure fiscal benefits. He sets up hedonic equations and measures the
irnpact of expenditure benefits and taxes on property values in the Edmonton, Canada
metropolitan area.
Both the demand curve and capitalization methodologies have only been applied using
cross-sectional data; as the application of the methods requires that the expenditures on the good
vaty systematically with the location of the recipient. The hedonic or capitalization approach has
some further limitations in that the methodology assumes that both benefits and tax burdens are
fully capitalized into property values. Yinger (1982) using bid-rent theory has shown that
benefits will not be totaUy capitalized into property values. The less than total capitalization of
benefits implies that the hedonic method does not offer much promise for accurate estimation of
local net fiscal benefits.13
mL. Methodological Issues Specific to Developing Countries
In addition to the general methodological points discussed in section II above, benefit
incidence studies for developing countries encounter a number of special considerations. These
include the large role that state enterprises may play in the delivery of specific public goods,
disparity in services provision between urban and rural areas and within urban and rural areas,
resalability of specific public goods, the expanded role for agricultural subsidies, as well as the
14
influence of public services on rural to urban migration. These issues apply to some extent in
developed economies, but take on special importance in developing economies.
Public Enterprises
Important public infrastructure services such as water, sewerage and electricity in many
developing countries are delivered through public enterprises. In estimating benefits, the
economic costs for services of the enterprise should be considered along with the amount of user.
fee paid for the service. In some countries, the user ile will equal the cost of the service and
ideally, consumer surplus or compensated variation should be used to measure consumer benefits.
If the enterprise runs an economic loss, then the net subsidy from central revenue should also be
allocated to households that receive these subsidized services.14 Deciding the anount of the
iinplicit subsidy from the central govenmuent will generally not be an easy matter, especially for
enterprises that report accounting profits, but actually suffer economic losses.
The benefits from access to public services, such as power for example, may appear
concentrated in the middle and upper income deciles of the population and in more urbanized
areas. However, some households may install evasion devices so that their electricity use is not
detected and billed. The implicit subsidy involved with illegal connections is often pro-poor.15
In summay, public enterprises with their subsidies and user fee orientations pose a particularly
challenging service provision area for benefit estimation.
The Geographic Distribution of Benefits
In many instances both the quantity and quality of output from a public service vary by
location within a country. This regional variation is particularly acute between urban and rural
regions. In developing countries regional variation in service delivery, together with regional
differences in cost-of-living, make it very important to report results at least for urban and rural
regions (particularly given the large fraction of the population living in rural areas in most
developing countries) and for other relevant regional divisions within the economy. In particular,
services from public enterprises, schools, health clinics and hospitals, and transportation may have
differential impacts in urban and rural areas, in addition to the more obvious examples of
agricultural programs and land refoin.
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There can also be significant variation in public services within the urban and rural
sectors, underscoring the point made above. For example, Selowsky (1979) finds significant
variation in educational, health and public utility services among urban areas of different sizes.
Meerman ('979) fmds significant variation in many public services among different rural
provinces of Malaysia.
In-Kind Transfers and Informal Markets
The potential for resale of in-kind goods provided by the government exists in both
developing and developed countries. However, this potential may be greater in most developing
countries due to their larger informnal sectors. To the extent that informal sector resale occurs,
the in-kind good provided to one person may confer benefits on several more individuals. For
example, sellers of in-kind goods receive the benefit income from the sales net of queuing costs
but buyers receive the consumer surplus from the good.16 Such transactions will make tracing
the benefits of public services particularly difficult, as individuals are unlikely to reveal in
household surveys the resale of in-kind goods.
Government Benefits and the Intrafamily Distribution of Resources
While many studies in developing countries use the household as the unit of analysis, this
ignores important effects of government programs on both intrafamily transfers among related
households and the intrahousehold distribution of resources. A first set of issues concerns the
difficulty of defining what constitutes a family in developing countries. Often the most
appropriate resolution of this issue would depend on the culture of the country, but available
survey data may not support culturally-relevant family definitions. For example, in Jamnaica,
fathers may have children by several women while being married to none of them. Yet the father
may provide partial support to the children and the mothers. Identification of such families may
not be possible with existing data.
Another set of issues concerns the potential of government benefits to displace the
existing pattem of intrafamily transfers.17 For exnample, Cox and Jlimenez (1992) estimate that
the institution of social security payments in Peru reduced private transfers from young to old
by 20 percent.
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Finally, govemment programs may differ in their effects on the intrahousehold distribution
of resources. For instance, recent theoretical analyses illustrate the well-known possibility that
in-kind benefits, being less fungible than cash benefits, can in some cases be more effectively
targeted at particular household members (Ross, 1988). Thus, benefits in the form of food or
education can be more beneficial for children than cash of equal value, if cash benefits accrue
differentially to the head of household (World Bank, World Development Report, 1990). Also,
many projects influence the role and status of women in the household (Fryer, 1986), though
comparatively little is known about such effects.
Food and Agricultural Programs
In many developing nations the agricultural sector plays a fundamental role in
development. Much of the population is directly or closely involved with agriculture (including
many of the most disadvantaged members of society), and a large fraction of GDP typically
originates in the agricultural sector. Thus, agricultural growth rates and the distribution of
income within the rural economy are of interest in and of themselves. Also, development theory
has long stressed the importance for growth of transferring agricultural resources, both peasant
labor and agricultural output, to the industrial sector (Lewis, 1954; Fei and Ranis, 1964; Sah and
Stiglitz, 1987)--though excessive migration from mral to urban areas can cause crowding,
unemployment, poverty-stricken squatter colonies, and civic unrest (Williamson, 1988, surveys
this literature).18
Agricultural programs in developing countries include: subsidization (or taxation) of
fertilizer, seed, and pesticides; subsidization of credit; subsidization of technology adoption;
subsidization (or taxation) of output and use of price controls, including govenmment purchases
(sales) and trade restrictions; irrigation schemes, improved transportation, and other rural public
works; and pro-poor land redistributions, restrictions on tenure, land settlement, and the
consolidation of holdings. Of these, only output taxation, regulation of trade, and regulation of
land tenure would not be classed as government expenditures.
Conventional analyses of these programs typically allocate benefits to households in
proportion to farm income, though in some cases benefits are partially allocated to food
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consumers or to farmers in particular income brackets (DeWulf, pp. 87-88, surveys the early
literature; see also Meerman, 1979; Foxley et al., 1979; Bahl et al., 1986).19 These allocation
rules assume that there is zero benefit shifting. In addition to the benefit shifting that reflects
the relative elasticities of supply and demand, benefit shifting may adse due to interlinked
markets and informal labor contracts, changing social sharing mechanisms, and migration effects.
Programs involving input subsidization, credit subsidization, technology subsidization, or
output subsidization can all be analyzed as negative taxes. In developed country tax incidence
studies, commodity subsidies are often believed to be at least partly passed forward to consumers.
One argument against forward shifting to consumers of subsidies in developing countries is that
in many cases the govemrnment maintains a fixed consumer price via export (import) controls or
govenmment purchases (sales) (Meerman, p. 234). However, shifts in agricultural subsidies would
require additional governnent policy changes to maintain fixed consumer prices (Sah and Stiglitz,
1987). Thus, the analyst fares a very complex issue.
In any event, even when subsidies do accrue to the agricultural sector, the subsidies may
not accrue to intended low-income farmers. For exaample, traditional economic relations in
agricultural markets are often characterized by interlinked markets and infomial labor contracts,
whereby peasants, who may be the statutory beneficiaries of subsidies, are kept near subsistence
through a variety of channels as landlords, moneylenders, and merchants appropriate any
increases in surplus (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1984; Bhaduii, 1983; Bell, 1988). Thus, in many
countries sizable fractions of the populaton remain indebted, landless, and near subsistence, even
in the post-fisc equiibrium, raising doubts as to the dbuton effects of government
subsidies.
Benefits from govenmment land reform and land settlement are typically treated differendy
than other benefits. Meerman assumes that land settlement costs accrue to resettled households.
Foxley assumes that land reform costs benefit agricultural labor. Both approaches encounter the
well-known problem that cost may be a poor proxy for benefit (especially given the investment
nature of such spending). In addition, while land reform often offers the only prospect of
breaking the cycles of poverty inherent in an unequal distribution of land, critics observe that the
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poorest farners quickly return to their landless state. If social support systems have been
destroyed in the process of refonn, the poorest members of society may even be net losers
(Fitzgerald, 1987). The allocation of benefits is clearly problematic in this context.
Migration
Many developing countries are vulnerable to brain drains or the loss of the investment in
human capital when wages or other arnenities are higher in alternative countries (Lee and Tan,
1984). Government funded scholarships for attending universities in other countries often carry
provisions that require the recipient to return to the home country and work for the govemment
for a period of time. Enforcement, however, varies widely among countries. In addition,
residents educated at domestic universities or high schools often can emigrate with few or no
restrictions.
In addition to emigration from the country, public services will often induce migration
from the rural to the urban areas. Better educational opportunities, better infrastructure and the
prospect of a job in the modem sector could induce migration from the rural to the urban areas
of a country (Todaro, 1969; Williamson, 1-988), and thus shift benefits between regions.
Providing better public services in urban compared to rural areas can lead to lower relative wages
between urban and rural areas if the public services differential induces migrtion from mral to
urban areas. The wage effects of geographically specific public services may significantly offset
the benefits from providing urban public services.
IV. Developed Country Benefit Incidence: Empirical Results
The benefit incidence literature for developed countries focuses primarily on the direct
benefits of govemment spending as proxied by their costs, largely ignoring the income and price
effects of govermnent spending and making at most, niinor allowances for benefit shifting.
Studies of this type for the United States include Gillespie (1965), Aaron and McGuire (1970),
Herriot and Miller (1972), Musgrave, Case, and Leonard (1974), Maital (1973, 1975), Reynolds
and Smolensky (1977), and O'Higgins and Ruggles (1981a).20 Other developed country studies
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include LeGrand (1982) and O'Higgins and Ruggles (1981b) for the United Kingdom, Gruske
(1985) for West Germany, and Leu et al. (1985) for Switzerland.
Of these, only O'Higgins and Ruggles (1981a and 1981b) allocate expenditures by
variables other than income, including number of earners per household, race, and sex. However,
they do not examnine these variables in conjunction with income. In none of the studies is
household income adjusted for household size or composition. Nor do the studies consider the
benefit effects of government spending on the intra-household distribution of resources.
Table 1 summarizes the main findings of this literature. There is general agreement that
among the studies that specific govenmment services have a pro-poor distribution in percentage
terms when benefits are calculated as a percentage of income. Transfer payments are clearly
pro-poor, and the allocation of so-called pure public goods depends greatly on one's essumptions
about the distribution of their benefits among households.
However, examining the distribution of expenditure (not as a percentage of income) on
specific govermment services in each group can yield very different answers about progressivity
(DeWulf, 1975; and Meerman, 1979), as the results reported in Table 1 also indicate. Given the
different conclusions reached from these two benefit incidence measures (expenditure and
expenditure as a percentage of income), we recommnend following O'Higgins and Ruggles (198 la
and 1981b) who report both sets of figures. We examine these results in greater detail below.
Specific Government Services
Specific or "allocable" govefrnment services include education, agriculture, highways, and
a variety of in-kind transfers (including transfers in the fonn of health care, housing, and
food).2 1 Educational benefits are typically distributed on the basis of school-age children per
household. In the United States education benefits are generally found to be pro-poor in
percentage terms and pro-rich in dollar terms. Similar results are found for the United Kingdom
(O'Higgins and Ruggles, 1981a and LeGrand, 1982) and Switzerland (Leu et al.). However, such
conclusions may be premature insofar as the studies surveyed typically ignored the following
considerations: (i) the investment return to educational achievement across income groups,
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TABLE 1
SELECTED INCIDENCE STUDIES FOR DEVELOPED COUNTiWES
Allocables Public
Studv, Country, Year of Data (Net of Transfer) Transfers Goods Total
Reynolds and Smolensky, United States, 1950 - (4) + (W) { J+ +
Gillespie, United States, 1960
Scenario A o(* + (+) (+) oW(+
Scenario B o() + (+) (o) -
Scenario M o (+) + () . -
Reynolds and Smolensky, United States, 1961 - + (4.) J l+) .
Henriot and Miller, United States, 1968
Scenario C -(+) + (+) od (+) o (+)
Scenario A - (+) + (+) -e -
Scenario M - (+) + (+) .
Musgrave, Case, and Leonard, United States, 1968
Scenario POP + then - (+) + (+) -(
Scenario INC + then- (+) + (+) -o (o) -(+)
Scenario CAP + then (-) + (+) b (t . -(
O'Higgios and Ruggles, United Kingdom, 1981
Scenario I + then o (+) (i) A (+) o (+)
Scenario 2 + theno (+) (i) - (o) - (+)
Scenario 3 + then o (+) (iL h (+) ,W
Leu. Frey. and B _hM Swierdalnd 1980 NA ( L ) _ -; J (4.) NA (
O!dake, West Germany, 1963-78 - (0) NA (+) 0 () - (+)
a"+" - pro-poor, "of - neutral, and "- pro-rich. The reported progsSivity reuts am basd on the
distibution of expediues across income deciles. The dgns in parthes are progessivity results based on
expenditure as a percentage of income in each decile. For a more detailed presentation of these results,
including more extensive notes on the various methodologies, see Selden and Wasyleako (1990).
bTypicaily includes defense, intemational security, public health, and other general expenditures.
Distributed one-balf by households and one-half by household income.
dDistributed by households.
'Distributed by household income.
*aital's (1975) calculations based on Aaron and McGuire (1970) (treats aU non-transfer expenditures as
public or general.)
SDisti.buted by individuals.
'Distibuted by capital income.
Transfes induded with allocable expenditumes in first colm
JDistributed one-half by population and one-half by income.
SOURCES: Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977, pp. 112-114, 124-129; Gillespie, 1965, pp. 138, 139, and
174; Heriot and Miller, 1972, pp. 46, 49; Musgrave, Case, and Leonard, 1974. pp. 285, 292,
294, and 300; O'Higgins and Ruggles, 1981a, pp. 307-308; Leu, Frey, and Buhmann. 1985,
p. 353; Griske, 1985, pp. 245-248.
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(ii) the distinction between measuring benefits and allocating costs, (iii) the wide variation in
school quality across jurisdictions (an obvious problem if quality is coffelated with income).
Benefits from government health spending, in the United States are typically found to be
pro-poor in both dollar and percentage terms (GiUlespie, 1965; O'Higgins and Ruggles, 198 lb),
though a number of studies do not report health benefits separately from other social services.
In the United Kingdom, however, health care benefits are not pro-poor as households in the
lowest-income deciles (O'Higgins and Ruggles, 1981a) and in lower socio-economic groups
(LeGrand, 1978) use the national health service at lower than average rates. Thus, health
spending in the United Kingdom is typicaUy pro-poor only when benefits are measured as a
percentage of income. Health spending in Switzerland is distributionally neutral in absolute terms
(Leu et al., 1985). Thus, even in developed countries national health systems may-be less pro-
poor than more carefully targeted programs.
Government expenditures on agriculture primarily consist of crop price supports (prior
to 1980 these were largely crop purchases). Other agricultural expenditures include extension,
research, and farm mortgage insurance (typically ignored, since it is an off-budget item).
Agricultural expenditures are typicaUy distributed on the basis of farn proprietorship (e.g.,
Musgrave, Case, and Leonard, Table 5) or net fann income (e.g., Reynolds and Smolensky,
Tables E.1-E.3). Because fann ownership increases with income, but more slowly than income,
the studies surveyed conclude that agriculture expenditures are pro-poor in percentage terms and
pro-rich in absolute tenrs.
Govemment highway expenditmes in developed economies are small in relation to all
goverument expenditures (roughly 5 percent in the United States in 1970). Highway expenditures
are typically allocated to households as drivers of automobiles and to households as consumers
of transported products (this is perhaps the only time benefit shifting is brought into the
analyses). Reynolds and Smolensky use a 50-50 split between drivers and consumers (Reynolds
and Smolensky, Table E.2), while Musgrave, Case, and Leonard use a two-thirds/one-third split
(see their Table 5). No authors explicitly account for the investment nature of highway
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expenditures, an especially large problem given the positive net investment during all periods
analyzed.
Transfer payments are clearly pro-poor in both absolute and percentage amounts if they
are fully allocated to recipients in any given year. However, these incidence measures of pu'blic
transfers do not account for their displacement effects on interhousehold private transfers.
Moreov r, social pension paym3nts should probably be viewed from a lifetimne perspective,
accounting for both taxes paid and cash benefits received. O'Higgins and Ruggles analyze social
pensions by age bracket and offer a perspective on the incidence of transfer payments across
generations of beneficiaries. Benefit analysis by age and income bracket helps distinguish
between the incidence on the younger and older elderly and discem how the lowest income
households fare in each generation of elderly.
General Public Goods
There is widespread disagreement not only about how to distribute general public good
benefits, but also about which goods and services to include in this category. Most authors
follow the Tax Foundation (1967) definition of public goods to be "national defense, general
government (excluding interest), transportation (excluding highways), commerce and finance,
housing and community developments, health and sanitation, civilian safety and miscellaneous"
(from Aaron and McGuire, p. 915). Other authors exclude public housing and health
expenditures, allocating benefits from those goods on the basis of use. Unfortunately, as noted
by DeWulf (1981, p. 69), no studies allow public good income elasticities to vary by the type
of public good, so that programs as different as defense and community development are assumed
to have the same relationship between benefits and income.
Benefit incidence for general public goods in the United States, the United Kingdom and
Switzerland are presented in Table 1. General goods are widely agreed to be pro-poor in
percentage terms and pro-rich in dollar terms, though many authors have criticized the results for
the arbitrry assumptions used to distribute benefits among households.
In contrast to the standard benefit incidence results above, Piggott and Whalley use a CGE
model for Australia to calculate both the marginal benefit and the full consumer surplus measures
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from general public goods. In particular, their marginal benefit measure suggests that general
expenditures are pro-poor, while their equivalent variation measures suggest the reverse. While
the assumptions underlying their results are no less restrictive than the studies in the Aaron and
McGuire marginal benefit tradition, the CGE results illustrate the problems involved when
marginal benefit measures are used to make inferences about large changes in public programs.
V. Developing Country Benefit Incidence: Empirical Results
Studies of Total Public Expenditure Benefits
Since the critical review by DeWulf, we are aware of only four comprehensive benefit
incidence studies: Meennan (1979) for Malaysia, Foxley et al. (1979) for Chile, Bahl et al.
(1986) for Korea, and Riboud (1990) for Costa Rica. Of these studies, Foxley et al., and Bahl
et aW., examine all government expenditures, whereas Meerman and Riboud place most of their
emphasis on specific government expenditures. The results of these full benefit incidence studies
are presented in Table 2. All four studies find government expenditures to be pro-poor in
percentage terms, while Meernan and Foxley et al., find government expenditures to be pro-rich
in dollar terms and Riboud finds government expenditures to be neutral in dollar terms.
In Meerman's benefit analysis, only about 33 percent cf expenditures are allocable direcly
to households based on their use of particular government services. Other specific expenditures
are assigned to households in proportion to their income, but Meerman does not assign to
households t2he benefits from general or unchargeable expenditures322 The total benefits based
on use of services, have a pro-rich distribution, but less so than the benefits assigned in
proportion to income.23
Foxley et al., analyze Chilean public expenditures (and taxes) using a 1969 survey of
households in Chile. They follow Meerman's methods for allocating specific services to
households based on their utilization of the service, when information of the service utilization
is available. Nonetheless, most of the analysis allocates expenditures to households based on
consumer expenditure, household income and, in some cases, on a per household basis (see
Poxley et al., Table 21). The results also show that the distribution of expenditures is more
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY RESULTS FOR TOTAL PUBLIC EXPFNDlTURE BENEFITS
IN FOUR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Author, Country, Year of Data Total Expenditures
Mecaman, Malayda, 1974 -s
Bahl et aL, South Korea
Urban 1965 +
1968 +
1971 +
1974 ++
Rural 1965 +
1968 +
1971 +
1974
Foxley et aL, Chile
I ~~~~~~~~~+
U ~~~~~~~~~+
Riboud, Cost Rima 1986 +
'A "plus indicates that public ex_diue ae pro-poor on equality
enhancing, while a "mius" indicates that public expenditures reduce equality on
a pro-rich Pogressvity rsults are based on expenditure as a percentage of
income compared across income gOups. BahI et aL also examines the percent
of total expenditure spent in each income class. They find expenditues
distributed mofe equally than income and with more progressivity over tume.
bA "4e" indicates that public expenditures are pro-poor and have become
inceasingly pro-poor in that region of the country during the 1965 to 1974 time
period. A "+-" indicates that public expenditures are pro-poor but have become
less pro-poor in that region of the country dudng the 1965 to 1974 time period.
SOURCES: Meennan, 1979, p. 321; Dabl et aL, 1986, pp. 150-215; Foxley
et aL, 1979, p. 119, Riboud, 1990, Table IL 4.
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pro-poor than the distribution of income. Unfortunately, the lowest income group in the Foxley
et al. study has 30 percent of the households in Chile. To some extent the most interesting part
of benefit incidence is what happens within the lowest 30 percent of the income distribution,
especially to the bottom 10 or 20 percent of the households in the income distribution. Thus,
their results shed little light on benefit incidence in the poorest households.
Baiil et al. examine the distribution of benefits in South Korea, in conjunction with taxes,
for 1965, 1968, 1971, and 1974. They analyze benefits for urban and rural residents using
household data. The data are separated into current and capital components, and 5 percent of the
annual capital expenditure is assumed to accrue to households as capital services in the current
year. Debt repayment is used to approximate the current services that accrue to households from
past capital expenditures. Because debt repayment is apparently not available by .expenditure
category, Bahl et A. do not present benefits for individual functions. However, they do allocate
the general components of expenditures to households based on both a household income or on
a per household basis. For example, one-half of health benefits is allocated to households based
on household income and one-half of health benefits is allocated on a per household basis. One-
half of education expenditures is allocated to households based on the number of students in the
household and the balance is allocated on the basis of household income. They use income,
consumption or per household bases to allocate expenditures on other functions to households.
The results suggest that benefits are distributad more equitably amnong family income
deciles than income. Moreover, in urban areas, the modernization of South Korea lead to a more
equitable distribution of benefits in 1974 than in 1965. But while the distribution of benefits in
rural areas is pro-poor in 1974, it is not as pro-poor in 1974 as in 1965.
The results of this study are interesting, but not very rich in comparison to the more
elaborate analysis of the health and education sectors that Meerman and others offer.
Nonetheless, the Bahl et al. study represents what is feasible when all functions are included in
the analysis, several different years are analyzed and the time frame for completing the project
is limited.
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Education
Govenmment expenditures on education average roughly 11 percent of total government
spending in low-income and lower-middle-income developing countries. However, perhaps
because of issucs surrounding equality of opportunity, rigidity in class structure, the extemal
effects of human capital, and interest in increasing fees to finance secondary education, education
has played a central role in the benefit incidence literature (for an early discussion of these
issues, see Psacharopoulos, 1977). In particular, existing benefit incidence calculations offer
important insights into the likely effects of reallocating governnent resources from higher
education to primary or secondary education.
Several recent studies done for various developing countries examine the distribution of
educational benefLts across income classes (see Table 3). Meerman (1979) for Malaysia and
Selowsky (1979) for Colombia represent the best known studies, but Foxley et al. (1979) for
Chile, Castenada (1989) for Chile, Riboud (1990) for Costa Rica, and Selden and Wasylenko
(1992) for Peru also report benefit results for education. Additional benefit incidence studies for
education include Jallade (1974) for Colombia, Dasgupta and Tilak (1983) for India, Meesook
(1984) and van de WaUle (1992) for Indonesia, Hammer et al. (1992) for Malaysia, and Petrei
(1987) for five countries in Central or South America.
All of these studies use household surveys to examine school attendance by household
and allocate educational benefits to households based on the number of children in the household
attending school. Most examine the distribution of benefits separately for urban and nural
households, and in some cases for households in different size urban areas. Meerman also
examines the benefits across races within Malaysia.
The studies typically find that benefits are pro-poor as a percentage of household income
for primary and secondary education and pro-rich for post-secondary education. Indeed, benefits
from primary and secondary education are often pro-poor when examined on a dollar basis, as
well. The pro-poor incidence occurs due to the greater number of children in lower-income
households. Thus, the results of these studies sunmarized in Table 3 generally confirm the
arguments of Psacharopoulos (1977) that expenditure on pnrmary education is pro-poor, while
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TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL SUBSIDY IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
BY COUNTRY AND REGION
I I ~~~~~Higher 
Author, Year of Data, Countrl T Prilmay Secondar= I Education T Total
Total Conuntrv -
Meerman- 1974- Malaysisi (eediturelb T - +
Selowfsky. 1974. Colomina (ependiture). +. + -
Jaflade. 1970. Colombia (expenditu) NA NA NA-
Fnxlev. et aL. 1969. Chile (expenditurefincome) 4. 4 . + +
Castenada- 1996. Chile (expenditure) + -_ +
Petrei (contribution to Gini Coefficient)
Argentina + + - +
Costa Rica + + - +
Chile + + - +
Dominican Republic + _ _ _
Uruguay + 4 _ + 
Meesook, 1978, Indonesia (Share of recufrent + ? _ -
expenditure compared to share of school-age children) _
van de Wagle, 1987, Indonesia (expenditure) + - _ 0
Dasgupta and TIlak, 1977, Andbra Pradesh India + + _ +
(expenditure) _ _
Selden and Wasylenko, 1985, Peru (expe_ dture) _ 4- + NA
Hammer, Nabi, and Cerone, 1989, Malaysia + - +
(expenditure)
Urban _
Selowsky, 1974, Colombia (expenditure) _ i. _ NA +
jallade, 1970, Colombia (expenditure) 7 ? _ -
Petrei (contribution to Gini Coefficient)
Costa Rica + + _ 0
Uruguay
+ + +
Meesook, 1978, Indonesia (Share of recurrent
expenditure compated to share of school-age childreo) + + _
van de Walle, 1987, Indonesia (expenditure) + _ _ +
Dasgupta and rldak, 1977, Andhra Pradesh India + + _ +
(expenditure)
Selden and Wasylenko, 1985, Pemr (expenditure) +- + NA
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TABLE 3 (CONT.)
Higher
Author, Year of Data, Country Primary Secondary Education Total
Rural
Selowsky, 1794, Colwnbia (expenditure) + NA +
lJaUade, 1970, Columbia (expenditure) NA NA NA +
Petrei (contribution to Gini Coefficient)
Costa Rica + _ _ +
Uruguay + _ + +
Meesook, 1978, Indonesia (Share of recurrent
expenditure compared to share of school-age children) + ? _
van de WaUe, 1987, Indonesia (expenditure) + _ _ +
Dasgupta and TIlak, 1977, Andha Pradesh India
(expenditure) + + _ +
Riboud, 1986, Costa Rica (expenditue) NA NA NA ?
Selden and Wasylenko, 1985, Pem (expenditure) _ s. +- + NA
*+ - pro-poor; - pro-rich, 0 neutral; +- eqpntues per household incas for first few deciles
and decrases tdwreafer ? - no dear patnte NA = not availab1e.
"Expenditure indicates that the equality conclusions are based on educational expenditure for households
acmss income groups; expenditueAncome indicates that the equaliy conclusions are based on educational
expenditures as a percentage of income across income groups.
SOURCES: Meerman (1979), p. 112; Selowsky (1979), pp. 6667; Jallade (1974), pp. 36-40; Foxley et aL
(1979), Castenada (1989), pp. 30 and 60; Petre (1987), pp. 84-88; Dasgupta and Tilak (1983);
Meesook (1984); Riboud (1990), Table 111.4; van de Walle (1992), Table 14; Selden and
Wasylenko (1992), Table 3.
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expenditure on higher education levels tends to be pro-rich, but the exact point in the education
system at which the rich become favored differs among countries. These same results generally
hold for both urban and rural areas, although secondary education is less likely to be pro-poor
in rural areas than in urban areas due to low attendance rates by the poor in rural areas.
Incidence pattems based on a single year of data may not capture accurately the changes
in behavior or policy that are in progress. For example, van de Walle (1992) examines education
in Indonesia and compares her results to those obtained by Meesook for 1978. The education
subsidy in 1987 is about as pro-poor as it is in 1978. However, in 1987, children from poorer
households are much more likely to attend lower and senior secondary schools than they are in
1978. For Malaysia, Hammer et al. (1992) find that educational subsidies at the primary and
secondary level favor the poor more in 1989 than in 1974. Higher education subsidies continue
to favor higher-income households, however.
Selden and Wasylenko find that in Peru the incidence pattem for educational subsidies
per school-age child differs from the incidence pattem for educational subsidy per child in school.
The fonner pattem tends to be less pro-poor than the latter at lower-income deciles, because a
lower proportion of children from lower-income households attend school, and thus, do not
receive the educational subsidy. However, at higher-income the incidence pattem of educational
subsidies per school-age child is also less pro-rich deciles than the per child in school measure.
Children from higher-income households are more likely to attend private schools and thus forego
the educational subsidy. In Peru at least, and probably in other countries, differences in the
patterns of school attendance 3mong children in different deciles and differences in the number
of children in different deciles affect the incidence pattem.
These studies encounter a number of methodological problems. For instance, marginal
benefits may decline with the level of education. In this case, studies that only allocate
expenditure and not total benefits may underestimate the degree to which education expenditure
benefits the poor, as they are more likely to consume primary education, which may have a
higher marginal benefit than secondary education. Better measures of benefits would be based
on willingness to pay, an approach pursued by Gertler and Glewwe (1989). Also, researchers
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differ on the measurement of capital inputs. Many studies ignore capital expenditure. Bahl et al.
allocate 5 percent of new capital expenditure as capital services accruing in the current year and
allocate repayments on existing debt as a proxy for the services from the existing capital stock.
In contrast, Meerman estimates the flow of services from the education capital stock as the
(estimated) capital stock multiplied by an interest rate of 15 percent (i.e., depreciation and
opportunity costs).
Another area of methodological weakness involves life-cycle questions. For instance,
James and Benjamin (1987) in a study of Japan show that families with younger household heads
are more likely to have both young children and low incomes while families with older
household heads have older children and higher incomes due simply to the age-earnings profiles.
Selden and Wasylenko (1992) find a similar pattem in Peruvian household age composition and
income. At any point in time then primary education expenditures will look more pro-poor and
higher education expenditures more pro-rich than they would if education expenditures were
viewed from a lifetime perspective based on the permanent income of the household and total
education received by household members. Another life-cycle issue missed by all studies is that
in some countries coUege graduates are entidtled to government positions they may not otherwise
obtain. Thus, govemment spending on such individuals does not always end with graduation.
FinaUy, the studies all ignore changes in relative prices, incomes, and location. For
instance, because rural-urban migration may be due to geographic differences in public services
as well as wage differentials, and because education expenditures exhibit an urban bias, the urban
benefits to education expenditures may be at least partially dissipated through increased urban
crowding, lower wages, and higher land prices. In addition, benefit studies typicaUy do not
account for educational service quality differences between urban and rural areas.
Despite these caveats, benefit incidence studies can yield important insights into proposed
changes in education, such as reallocating resources from higher education to primary and
secondary education. A second policy might be to increase user fees for all or some levels of
education. Here the evidence to date suggests that this may have adverse consequences for the
poor, particularly if fees are increased for primary education. A third policy might be to target
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stipends to poor students at all levels of education. In this regard, Meernan (1979) and
Chernichovsky and Meesook (1985) look at the indirect costs--uniforms, transportation, foregone
labor earnings and other expenses--of schooling that can become a relatively high share of
income for low-income households and deter school attendance.2 4 a5
Health
Govenmment health expenditures total roughly 5 percent of government expenditures in
developing countries (de Ferranti, 1985). While these expenditures are only a small portion of
total spending, there has been considerable interest in recent proposals for increased user fees,
improved efficiency of health care providers, and reallocation of resources from curative to
preventive care. Distributional questions have played a central role in this debate, both because
health care costs can be large relative to the incomes of the poor, and because of what Musgrave
termed "merit goods arguments" in favor of universal health care.2 6
Recent benefit incidence calculations for public health spending in developing countries
include Sahota (1977) for Panama; Meerman (1979) for Malaysia; Selowsky (1979) for
Colombia; Foxley et al. (1979) for Chile; Meldau (1980) for Colombia; Meesook (1984) and
van der Wallc (1992) for Indonesia; Bahl et al. (1986) for South Korea; Petri (1987) for five
Central or South American countries; and Riboud (1990) for Costa Rica. These studies employ
a wide variety of methods for estimating expenditures and for allocating the expenditures on
govenmment health programs to households.27 Incidence simulations based on wilingness to
pay have also been performed by Gertler et al. (1988) for Peru. Finally, recent studies that
provide a wealth of distribution-related data, but do not provide formal benefit incidence analyses
include Griffim (1990) for Asia and Castenada (1989) for Chile.
There are a large number and variety of govenmment health programs in many developing
countries and each has very different distributional implications. It follows that the best benefit
incidence studies rely on survey data of household utilization of specific health services (e.g.,
Meermian, 1979; Hanmmer et al., 1992; Selowsky, 1979; and Foxley, 1979; Meesook, 1984; van
de Walle, 1992; Riboud, 1990). In all cases, care must be taken to account for both monetary
and nonmonetary costs of the household of utilization, especially since' fees often vary with
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ability to pay.28 Moreover, the quantity and quality of care received may differ from utilization
or the number of trips made to physicians or hospitals per se. Nevertheless, efforts to determine
benefit incidence based on household utilization data for individual programs can be much more
informative than simply allocating the benefits of the health care system as a whole by household
income, by household size, or as a general good.
Benefits from curative health care expenditures are typicaUy pro-poor in percentage terms
(less so in dollar terms) (see Table 4). When researchers are able to distinguish among types of
care, inpatient care is less pro-poor than outpatient care, which is, in turn, less pro-poor than
preventive care. However, the incidence results vary greatly among countries. Riboud examines
1986 data for Costa Rica reported by Sauma and Trejos (1990) that suggest health expenditures
in that country are significantly pro-poor. Hanuner et al. (1992) fmd that health expenditures in
Malaysia favor the poor more in 1989 than in 1974. In contrast, Meesook reports 1978 data for
Indonesia suggesting that government health care benefits are significantly pro-rich in that
country.29 van de Walle fmds that the health care subsidy in Indonesia remains pro-rich in
1987, although the poor have captured more of the subsidy by 1987. The health care subsidy
gains accrue to the urban poor in Indonesia, and the rural poor do not gain between the time
periods. Selowsky and Meesook also report benefit. incidence separately by region, though in
both cases the separate incidence results for each region are roughly the same as the total results.
Benefit incidence analyses of health programs can provide important insights into
proposed policy changes. Two policies of recent interest are: moving resources from curative
to preventive care, and increasing user fees. With respect to the former, the benefits of increased
prevention programs would likely be concentrated more heavily on the poor than the rich, since
higher-income households already have higher rates of inoculation and other preventive measures,
and the marginal benefits would likely accrue to the poor. At the same time, publicly-funded
curative care tends to be less pro-poor and reductions in curative care expenditures would affect
the poor less than the rich. With respect to increasing user fees, relatively high utilization by the
poor of aU health services suggests that the poor will pay a substantial portion of such fees (or
reduce their consumption of public health). Thus, it is critical to specify how the user fees would
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TABLE 4
THE BENEFIT INCEDENCE OF GOVERNMENT HEALTH PROGRAMS,
BY COUNTRY AND REGION.
I Out atient and Other
Author. Year of Data. Country Inpatient I VPublc Health I TotaL
l To~~~~~~~tal Coun -
F03leX. 196.6 CbiJeb NA NA + (+I
Sabota- 1970. Pnnnea' NA MA NA
Meernno. 1974. Malaufa,b ± (+) + (+O
Selow-lcy 1974 Colobmnb + 4+ ? (+) ? (+'
Petrei
Argentina NA NA NA (+)
Costa Rica NA NA NA (+)
Chile NA NA NA (+)
Dominican Republic NA NA NA (+)
Uruguay NA NA NA (+)
Meldau, 1970, Colombia' - (NA) + (+) + (+)
Meesook, 1978, Indonesia _d (NA) _o (NA) _ (NA)
van de Walle, 1987, Indonesia - (+) - (+) - (+) |
Riboud, 1986, Costa Rica + (+) + (+) + (+)
Hammer, Nabi, Cerone, 1989, Malaysia 4. (+) 4 (4) + (+) 
Urban
Selowsky, 1974, Colombiab + (+) 7 (+) J + (.)
Meesook, 1978, Indonesia _ (NA) o (NA) - (NA)
van de Walle, 1987, Indonesia - (+) t___ __(+) - (+)
Rural _
Selowsky, 1974, Colombiab ? (+) 0 (4) ? (+)
Meesook, 1978, Indonesia _d (NA) -o (NA) - (NA)
van de WaUe, 1987, Indonesia - (0) - (+) - (+)
'+ = pro-poor, - = pro-rich; 0= neutral; ? = no clear picture; NA= not available. Results are based on
benefits per household. Results based on benefits/income are presented in parentheses.
bResults based on survey data
'Results based on ad hoc allocatois across households.
dAlI hospital care.
'Public health clinics only.
SOURCES. Foxley, 1979, p. 108; Sahota, 1977, p. 216; Meemnan, 1979, pp. 158-160; Selowsky, 1979, pp.
89-96; Petrei 1987, p. 47; Meldau, 1980, p. 138; Meesook, 1985, p. 69; Riboud, 1990, Table
lLt4; van de Walle, 1992, Table 18.
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be levied and how the revenues generated would be spent. These conclusions are largely
confimed by Gertler et al. (1988). They estimate the demand for public and private curative
care using flexible functional forms and use the estimates obtained to simulate differential
expenditure incidence analyses of increased user fees, where incremental revenues are spent on
reducing time costs by opening more clinics. Gertler et al. conclude that such changes would
be pro-rich, reinforcing the view that while user fees can enhance efficiency, they may reduce
equity unless fees are levied progressively or revenues are used in a pro-poor manner.
Electricity, Water and Sewerage
The literature on benefit incidence has typically not analyzed the benefits from public
enterprises. As services are typically not metered, calculations of the net subsidies for particular
enterprises to individual households are difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, the Selowsky and
Meerman studies are able to examine access to electricity, water and sewerage services among
income groups in Colombia and Malaysia, respectively. In addition to these two studies,
Maddock and Castano use compensated variation to measure the benefits from electric services
that accrue to households in Medellin, Colombia.
Selowsky examines access to infrastructure service among income quintiles in Colombia
using household survey data for 1970 and 1974. He finds that households residing in urban areas
having higher income are more likely to have these public services (see Table 5). Between 1970
and 1974, however, he finds a pro-poor distribution for new connections among households, but
households receiving new connections are more likely to live in larger urban areas. Among
households in rural areas, the new connections are not nearly as pro-poor as in the urban areas.
Selowsky also examines whether supply availability or lack of demand is responsible for the
lower number of connections to these public services among lower income households. His
survey evidence suggests that the cost of service deters most households that are without service
from connecting to the supply or that demand rather than supply constraints lead households to
live without these public services.
Also using 1974 survey data, Meerman examines household access to electricity, piped
water and sewerage by income quintile. His findings for Malaysia are similar to those of
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TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC UT!LITY SERVICES IN TWO COUNTRIES:
MALAYSIA, COLOMBIA
___________ Electricity
Author, Year of Data, Country Urban Rural Country
Meerman, 1974, Malaysab -' _
Selowsky, 1974, Colombiab _ _
Maddock and Castano, 1986, Medellin, + NA NA
Colombia 0 I_ I
Household Piped Water
Meerman, 1974, Malaysiad _ __
Selowsky, 1974, Colombiad _ _
Publk or Private Sewerage
Meerman, 1974, Malaysiae _ 
Selowsky, 1974, Colombia _
' = pro-poor, - = pro-icbh 0= neutal; ? = no clear pattern; NA = not available.
bPerceage of households with connections by income quitile.
'Compenated vaiation for users of electricity.
dPercentage of households with water supply by income quindle.
"Perountage of households with sewerage comnections by income quintle.
SOURCES: Meeuman (1979), pp. 182, 202, 213; Selowsky (1979), Tables SA-28, SA-30, SA-
32; and Maddock and Castano (nd.).
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Selowsky. The distribution of service connections for electricity, water and sewerage is pro-rich,
with the percentage of households in any income quintile receiving services increasing with the
size of the urban area. Meerman also finds that the percentage of households connected to these
services is greater for Chinese and Indian households than for Malay households.
Maddock and Castano examine the compensated variation associated with block pricing
of electrical utility services in Medellin, Colombia. While they fmd the practice of charging
higher prices for large electricity users is pro-poor, their empirical work focuses on electricity
usage and does not account for households without electrical services or for households with
illegal connecdons to electrical services (see Maddock and Castano, p. 6). Thus, the Maddock
and Castano study cannot be taken as evidence of a pro-poor distribution of net benefits from
electrical service. From the evidence available, the working hypothesis must be-that lower
income and rural households receive the least total subsidy for these public services.
The Whittington et al. (1988), Whittington et al. (1989) and Altaf et al. (1989) studies
offer insight into why low income households do not connect to the public water system, even
when they apparently can afford to do so. These studies suggest changes in program design that
miight change low-income households demand for connection to the public water system.
Altaf et al. fmd in Pakistan that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the annual or recurrent
charge for water and not the one-time connection charge is the deterrent to the poor connecting
to public systems. The availability of alternative water sources also influences the probability
of connecting to public systems.
The two studies by Whittington et al. raise similar issues for two regions in Nigeria. In
both regions the poor have altemative sources of water, which is from trucks that bring water to
the village. Some low-income households purchase water directly from the truck, while others
purchase the water from intermediaries who have purchased water from the truck. In both cases,
households do not want the commitnent of paying a fixed monthly charge for water, or they
want the option of paying ondy for water during the dry season. Thus, households prefer a
metered system to that of unlimited use and a fixed monthly charge. The fact that households
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do not trust the quality of the water sold from the govenmment also significantly deters
households from connecting to the public water system.
Based on these results, Whittington et al. propose supplying public water to villages from
a central kiosk o. set of kiosks, where kiosks will be metered and water purchasers would be
charged for the water that they purchase. This system avoids the substantial costs of metering
all houses, and allows households to purchase the exact amount of publicly supplied water that
they want. A side benefit is that the public water system can demonstrate its reliability to the
households.
Food and Agricultural Programs
In many developing nations the agricultural sector plays a fundamental role in
development. Much of the population is directly or closely involved with agriculture (including
many of the most disadvantaged members of society) and a large fraction of GDP typically
orginates in the agricultural sector. Also, development theory has long stressed the importance
for growth of transferring agricultural resources to the industrial sector (Lewis, 1954; Fei and
Ranis, 1964; Sah and Stiglitz, 1987).3° Finally, government food distribution programs can
have impotant welfare effects by increasing food consumption among the poorest households
and by reducing wage rates in nonagricultural occupations. We discuss agricultural programs
before tuming to food programs.
While any govemrnment program may differentially affect the agricultural sector through
urban-ural variauon, a more narrow list of goverunent expenditures in agriculture includes:
(i) subsidization of ferllizer, seed, pesticides, credit, and technology adoption; (ii) govenmment
purchases (sales) of agricultural outputs; (iii) public works development of agricultural
infrastructure; and (iv) land redistribution. Benefit incidence studies that explicitly examine
agriculture include Meerman for Malaysia, Foxley et al. for Chile, and Bahl et al. for Korea.
Due to the scarcity of household survey data on program participation, most studies
assume that agricultural benefits are distributed in proportion to farm income, though Bahl et al.
allocate benefits partly in proportion to farm income and partly in proportion to food
consumpdon, and some authors make different distributional assumptions for land reforn, small
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farmer projects, and agricultural credit.31 Moreover, due to the scarcity of cost data on
individual programs, the analyses are often conducted at a very aggregate level.
Allocating the benefits of agricultural programs according to farm income leads to the
conclusion that agricultural programs do not greatly affect the rural income distribution. In
addition, the assumptions virtuaUy insure that the overaU contribution of agricultural programs
is pro-poor to the extent rural houseiolds are poorer than urban households. While these results
may be substantiaUy correct, they offer few insights into the distributional implications of policy
changes that reallocate resources among agricultural programs.32
The allocation of progrnam costs by farm income involves a strong assumption that
benefits are not shifted ahead to consumers. This seems unlikely even in the presence of
government-imposed commnodity price rigidities.33 Benefits might also be shifted backwards
to laborers. Finally, benefits may be shifted to landlords, moneylenders, and merchants, due to
interlinked markets and informal labor contracts. For instance, peasants, who may be the
statutory or direct beneficiaries of an agricultural program, may remain near subsistence levels
of welfare in the post-fisc equilibrium as landlords, moneylenders, and merchants appropriate any
increases in surplus (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1984; Bhaduri, 1983; Bell, 1988).
Given the complex shifting possibilities for agricultural benefits, one fruitful approach
may be to calculate incidence using computable general equilibrium techniques. Two recent
contributions in this literature are by Hertel (1989), who examines agricultural policy in the
United States, and Parikh and Srinivasan (1989), who make incidence comparisons among
agricultural infrastructure, fertlizer subsidies, and agricultural output subsidies. They fnd that
the infrastructure expenditures have pro-poor distributional implications, resulting from the
benefits of employment opportunities from the infrastucture projects for the poor.
Turning to food programs, Foxley et al. find the distribution of food subsidies in Chile
to be pro-poor in dollar terms. Riboud (1990) also finds the distribution of food program benefits
in Costa Rica to be pro-poor in dollar terms and narrowly targeted at individuals aged S to 14.
Grosh (1990) uses survey data and finds that public food programs in Jamaica are effectively
targeted at the poor. In addition, a number of studies use systems of demand equations to
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simulate the welfare implications of reducing subsidies for various types of food. For instance,
Laraki (1989) finds that reduced subsidies would adversely affect the poor, despite the pro-rich
distribution of the food subsidy.34
Consumer Price Subsidies
Eastern Europe's desire to move to a private market-based economy raises questions
concerning the equity effects of removing consumer subsidies. The Govemment of Hungary
(1989) has undertaken a partial equilibrium analysis for Hungary. Data from a household survey
undertaken in 1987 and updated to 1989 are analyzed. The main conclusion of the Hungarian
report is that the distribution of the per capita total subsidy is pro-rich, as the amount of the per
capita subsidy increases with income decile. More specifically, per capita subsidies for rent,
fuels, milk and diary products, transportation, cinema and theater, and mortgage interest are pro-
rich (see Government of Hungary, statistical appendix, page 39).
On the other hand, the subsidy amount as a percentage of income decreases with income
decile implying that the subsidy has an equalizing effect on the distribution of income. For
specific products, the subsidies to milk products, fuel, transportation, school books and mortgage
interest are pro-poor when measured as a percentage of income, while subsidies to cinema and
theater are sdll pro-rich (see Govermment of Hungary, statistical appendix, page 42). In addition,
the analysis reveals that the total subsidy as a percentage of income increases with family size
and has an urban bias.
VI. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
The available empirical results for developing countries suggest that the benefit incidence
of spending on human services, such as education and health, is pro-poor when measured as a
percentage of income and either pro-poor or pro-rich when measured in dollar terns depending
on the public service under analysis. Benefit recipients are also particularly concentrated in urban
areas, perhaps because of lower delivery costs. Government agricultural programs are typically
believed to be distributionally neutral in percentage terms arnong farmers--who may be poorer
than the national average, but wealthier than agricultural laborers or rural nonfarn laborers. The
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benefits of general goods, such as defense, police, and adniinistration, are typically allocated as
if they are pro-poor when measured as a percentage of recipient income and favor urban
inhabitants.
For developing countries, benefit incidence studies concentrate heavily on a few countries.
Few studies have been done for countries outside of Central and South America--and we are not
aware of any benefit incidence studies for Africar. countries. Given the scarcity of results and
the World Bank's continued interest in distributional issues (e.g., Conable, 1990, p. 299), we
believe that further benefit incidence research may yield laige benefits for policy makers. In
addition, while survey costs for some earlier studies were high, increasing availability of
household survey data may have substantially lowered the costs of undertaking research in this
area (though in some cases minor modifications of the survey instruments may be required to
generate the required data).
To make sure this research is of greatest possible value to policy makers, we make a
number of recommendations on conducting benefit incidence analyses. First, aggregate results
based on the zero-government counterfactual rely on very strong assumptions about fixed relative
prices and incomes, government efficiency, and the relationship between marginal and total
benefits. Also, those studies are often not designed to identify which types of public services
benefit the poor. We believe that researchers should focus more on providing benefit incidence
studies on specific government functions or programs that can help policy makers reach
conclusions about proposed reallocations of resources among govemment programs. Second,
benefit incidence should be assigned to households based on household survey information on
usage rather than on ad hoc assumptions that assign benefits based on income or the number of
members in the household. Third, improved annual cost measures for services need to be
developed, particularly with respect to capital inputs. Fourth, researchers should group
households by deciles and whenever possible should consider other groupings, including
household income adjusted for household composition, age, location, and other relevant socio-
economic variables. Finally, careful attention to life-cycle benefits, benefit shifting, rent-seeking,
out-of-pocket costs, displacement of private sector efforts, average versus marginal incidence, and
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a number of other issues discussed above can significantly raise the value' of benefit incidence
studies to policy makers.
Of course, even if researchers adhere to these guidelines, benefit incidence analysis
remains an exercise in the allocation of government outlays rather than rigorous research into
welfare-based benefit measures. Thus, while we believe this literature is very infornative, we
also believe that it is desirable, whenever possible, to complement benefit incidence studies with
other forms of research. One direction for additional research is to estimate the full consumer
surpluses associated with policy reforms. Inportant work in this area includes the on-going
research efforts of the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Survey. Another important
line of inquiry includes more "institutional" research into the details of service delivery that
thwart the utilization of programs targeted by lower-income households. Inportant examples of
this sort of research include Whittington et al., Meerman, Meesook, and Chemichovsky and
Meesook.
In addition to formal research efforts, project teams wil typically perform benefit
incidence analyses under severe time and financial constraints. How can more fonnal research
inform field work and mnissions that need reliable benefit incidence answers under more severe
time pressures? In general terms, the research findings suggest several focal points for short-term
missions. First, compared to other countries at similar levels of development, does the
expenditure pattern for the country in question suggest a misallocation due to an unusual share
of GDP spent on general goods as opposed to social services? Second, with any social service,
do expenditures seem skewed towards the primary urban area relative to population living in the
secondary urban or rural areas, and are expenditures concentrated on services that studies reveal
benefit households in higher income deciles? Such concentrations of benefits suggest reforms,
such as reallocation of services to rural areas, and increasing user fees for the social services
consumed at higher income deciles. Costs recovered could then be allocated to services known
to benefit the poor. Third, studies that have examined the reasons for low participation of poorer
households in public services of interest to the mission can give the mission a head start in
identifying potential institutional barriers prevrwnting the poor from consuming services. Armed
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with a set of potential problems in targeting benefits to the poor, missions can identify altemative
programs or specific short-term studies that could lead to more effective policy making.
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Endnotes
1. For two reviews of the tax incidence literature, see Bird and DeWulf (1973), and Shah
and Whalley (1992).
2. Recent theoretical analysis of targeting include Besley and Kanbur (1988), Besley and
Coate (1989), and Ravallion (1989).
3. The incidence effects of government regulations are not examined by either tax, benefit,
or expenditure incidence analysis, and therefore constitute a fourth, and relatively
unexamined, area of incidence analysis (Willig and Bailey, 1981).
4. There is some ambiguity in the terms pro-rich and pro-poor. Pro-rich means that benefits
from public goods are higher for households with higher incomes, while the opposite
holds when benefits have a pro-poor distribution. As discussed later, some research
examines benefits per household in measuring pro-rich or pro-poor, while other research
examines benefits as a percent of household income in measuring pro-rich or pro-poor.
5. For an excellent example of what is possible in this regard, see Meerman (1979).
6. An example of this approach that avoids double counting is Bahl et al. (1986). The
reasonableness of using interest payments as a proxy for capital services depends on the
country's borrowing practices, the rate of capital depreciation, and whether borrowing
exclusively finances public capital rather than current expenditure.
7. Researchers have adjusted current income data in a variety of ways to account for the
problems that the use of current income introduces to the incidence analysis. For
exanple, to avoid nonsensical results in his United States tax burden estimnates, Pechman
(1985, pp. 77-80) eliminates from his data the 5 percent of households with the lowest
current income. The households are for the most part only temporarily in the low-income
group and have consumption and other variables that do not match-up with their reported
current income. Davies, St. Hilaire and Whalley (1984) examine lifetime incidence of
taxes for Canadian households. They find that both lifetime incidence and anmual
incidence analyses suggest a mildly progressive pattem for tax burden in Canada. But
income taxes are less progressive in lifetime than in annual incidence calculations. Other
taxes axe less regressive in their lifetime incidence than in their annual incidence. In
research discussed later in this paper, James and Benjamin (1987) analyze education
benefits correcting for deficiencies in current income measures of well-being.
8. An exception is Burkhauser (1986) who examines the distribution of social security
benefits in Panama using the eaniing histories of beneficiaries. While cross-section
analysis based on current income suggests a pro-poor distribution, since most beneficiaries
had retired, many of these beneficiaries had relatively high eamings prior to retirement,
so that the distribution of benefits may, in fact, be pro-rich from a permanent income
perspective.
9. Despite limitations on data to implement lifetime income and benefit incidence analysis,
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Holtzmann (1989) demonstrate the problems with the
conventional single period analyses. While conventional analysis could be misleading,
Holtzmann also shows that lifetime benefit analyses are very sensitive to the assumptions
made about individuals' time preference, risk aversion and other parameters.
10. Meerman (1979) is an excellent example of a study that examines benefits for a number
of socio-economic and geographic partitions of an economy.
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11. A number of recent refinements to the Gini measure have been proposed. Kienzle (1982)
and Bridges (1984) develop aggregate expenditure measures based on the tax incidence
measure developed by Suits (1977). Lambert and Pfahler (1988) modify the aggregate
expenditure approach to obtain measures that are invariant to equal additions to each
individual's tax payment and benefit from govemrnment spending, drawing on the tax
progressivity analyses of Kakwani (1977).
12. Linn (1980) reviews the findings on the distribution of local government expenditure
benefits and tax burdens for three cities in Colombia.
13. In fact, Chaudry-Shah (1989, p. 373) states that he finds capitalization of a very small
portion of expenditures. For a review of capitalization as it applies to local public
fmance, see Chaudry-Shah (1988). For other analyses of hedonic pricing, see Follain and
Jimenez (1985), Kanemoto (1988), Kanemoto and Nakamura (1986), and Scotchmer
(1985).
14. For evidence on the deficits of public enterprises, see Nair and Filippides, 1988.
Selowsky (1979, Chapter 5) provides a detailed methodology for calculating the subsidy
to users of public enterprise services, and Linn (1980) provides a helpful discussion of
alternative methods to calculate consumer subsidies from public enterprises.
15. For examnple, Maddock and Castano (n.d.) data suggest that about 10 percent of electricity
is stolen in Medellin, Colombia. They suggest that much of the stolen electricity (though
not all) benefits poor households.
16. Several papers have examined the valuation of benefits from in-kind goods (Olsen, 1972;
DeSalvo, 1975; Smeeding, 1984; and Olsen and York, 1984). For a theoretical discussion
of benefits with queuing costs, see Alderman (1987).
17. Such effects occur in developed countries (e.g., Lampman and Smeeding, 1983), but may
be even more pronounced in developing countries. In fact, private transfers are an
important component of household income in developing countries examined in the
research papers reported in Rempel and Lobdell (1978) and Cox and Jimenez (1992).
Also, Knowles and Anker (1981) find significant transfers from young to old in Kenya,
while Butz and Stan (1982) discover similar results in Malaysia as do Ravallion and
Dearden (1988) in Java.
18. While the urban-rural and industrial-agricultural distinctions do not exactly coincide, there
is often important overlap.
19. One problem in this regard is that factor incomes already include subsidization, so that
subsidies must be netted out of factor income to obtain ex ante income (Meerman, p.
234).
20. To our knowledge, more recent studies for developed countries do not exist. We
speculate that the lack of recent studies is parly due to theoretical objections to the
benefit incidence methodology, and pardy due to a shift in focus toward analysis of
individual programs or sets of programs.
21. Public housing and health expenditures are in some cases classified as public goods.
22. In a subsequent analysis, Meerman (1980) examines who "pays" for administrative
expenditures by calculating the difference between income and after-tax income adjusted
for specific government benefits. He finds that higher income groups overwhelmingly
pay for "social overhead" expenditures.
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23. Meermnan presents the results as expenditure benefits per household in each decile as a
percentage of average household per capita income for all households in the sample.
Thus, he has sirnply normalized total benefits or divided total benefit per household by
a constant (average household income). Thus, the distribution of benefits is on a total
basis rather than as a percentage of income.
24. For instance, Meerman finds that out-of-pocket costs, such as uniforns, shoes, lunch,
transportation, books and supplies, amount to 13 percent of household income in the first
income quintile and 11 percent of household income in the second income quintile.
25. Obviously there are a wide range of policy altematives and we do not pretend to
summarize them here. For a good summary of the policy options see Psacharopoulos,
Tan and Jimenez (1986), Jimenez (1986), (1987) and (1989), and Mingat and Tan (1985),
(1986a), and (1986b). For a detailed discussion of the role of education in development,
see Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) and Tan and Mingat (1989). Psacharopoulos
(1985) also examines the return to education.
26. TeclnicaLly, if one adopts a merit goods perspective, the relevant question is not how
government health benefits affect the post-fisc income distribution, but instead how such
benefits affect the post-fisc distribution of health or health care (Foxley, 1979, pp. 106-
110).
27. Of course, average cost may be a poor proxy for marginal benefit. For example, if
marginal cost equals average cost, user fees set below marginal cost suggest that
individuals will utilize care until marginal benefit is below marginal and average cost.
There may also be an insurance value associated with health care, which is not
represented in the average cost measure of health care benefits.
28. However, note that higher fees paid by the rich are often associated with higher quality
of care, so that studies using average cost per visit should probably use average fee per
visit in calculating household benefits (Meerman, pp. 159-160). Also, see Selowsky (p.
81) for the appropriate treatment of premium contributions to public health care plans.
29. Unfortunately Meesook's data do not pennit her to distinguish between govemment and
private hospital care. Nevertheless, even if all private care were consumed by the well-to-
do, the distribution of public hospital subsidies would still be pro-rich overall.
30. Of course, excessive migration to urban areas can also cause crowding, unemployment,
poverty-stricken squatter colonies, and civic unrest (Williamson, 1988, surveys this
literature).
31. For instance, Meennan allocates land settlement costs to resettled farmers, and Foxley et
al. allocate agricultural credit to medium and large farmers.
32. When survey data on utilization exist but there are no corresponding data on program
costs, researchers might folow Meerman and Selowsky, both of whom derive useful
insights from utilization data alone.
33. That is, it can be argued that forward shifting to consumers of agricultural benefits in
developing countries does not exist when the govenment acts to maintain a fixed
consumer price (e.g., Meerman, p. 234). In this case, however, there are really two
government actions, an agricultural program and a price program, so that one should
explicitly examine the incidence effects of both.
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34. Other related studies include Alderman and von Braun (1985), Pinstrup-Anderson and
Alderman (1987), and Behrman and Deolaikar (1990).
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